Often I am asked to advise individuals who have a single-focused
responsibility on how to stay tuned in to the whole quality management
system. In this blog, I provide a story of the value of thinking
outside of one's own box; a story on quality management system
interfaces and how FDA Investigators pull all information together to
evaluate your company’s compliance with 21 CFR 820, Quality System
Regulations and perhaps even issue FDA-483 observations.
The
story easily becomes a case study on how different parts of the
regulation support each other, and how compliance or personal
responsibility for one section doesn't stop there – while the
career-oriented individual needs to do his or her own job, they must
also understand how other areas affect it – to the point of
understanding how broadly and deeply to look for solutions to specific
problems.
The following story is not theory -- it's career advice based on a specific case.
Corrective
action/preventive action is a concept embodied in 21 CFR Part 820 (Good
Manufacturing Practices, Quality System Regulation) as well as in ISO
13485:2003.
I
visit (and audit) many medical device manufacturers. Most are very
knowledgeable about Corrective Action. The purpose of Corrective Action
is to collect and analyze information, to identify and investigate
known product problems and known quality problems, and to take
appropriate and effective corrective action and prevent the problem
recurrence (meaning the manufacturer needs to take action so that the
problem does not happen again).
Unfortunately,
too often I see the same manufacturers struggle with the application of
Preventive Action. The purpose of Preventive Action is exactly that of
Corrective action with very subtle yet distinct differences: to
collect and analyze information, to identify and investigate potential
product problems and potential quality problems, and to take appropriate
and effective preventive action in an effort to prevent these problems
from occurring (that is, the manufacturer must prevent a failure).
The
ultimate goal is continuous improvement focused on quality. To ensure
effective corrective actions/preventive actions, the identification of
failure incidence (actual or potential) is pivotal in identifying the
actions undertaken. These failure incidences are the records US FDA
reviews during their investigation. After all, corrective
action/preventive action, next to Management Responsibility, is perhaps
the most important process of the overall quality management system.
To
achieve effective corrective action/preventive action process acuity,
it is important to track, manage and assess different quality data
points within the organization and to manage key interfaces throughout
the quality management system. I recently audited a global medical
devices company that is perhaps the world's second-largest producer of
advanced wound management products. While reviewing records for the
control of nonconforming products I was able to effectively link to
material control procedures and found a previously unrecognized
potential problem.
The
company’s procedures allow the use of nonconforming product. This is
not as unusual a practice as you might believe. FDA takes such
practices very seriously. The regulations require a higher level of
control when a company’s Material Review Board decides to use
nonconforming product “as-is”.
My
client’s system requires each use “as-is” disposition to be documented,
and an evaluation is performed to ensure that continued use of the
nonconforming product does not compromise the safety and effectiveness
of the finished device. The company’s procedures were well defined and
documented according to the requirements of 21 CFR 820.90,
“Nonconforming Product”. However, my next task was to review the
implementation of this procedure before I could determine conformance to
regulations.
I
requested any analysis conducted on the frequency of use “as-is”
dispositions. The company stated the occurrence of use “as-is”
dispositions is not an item trended with graphs or Pareto charts.
However, the company provided me with a hand-written line graph for the
number of occurrences of this disposition over the past 6 months. I
randomly selected the disposition of use “as-is” occurring in July 2011
for review.
The
company opened a nonconforming report for a particular component
failing to meet dimensional specification on 20 July 2011. The Material
Review Board decided to use the components “as-is” on 21 July 2011.
The lot of defective components would not be sorted because all of the
components had the same dimensional defect. Rework was impossible
without destroying the component.
The
length of time from open to disposition was but one day and appeared to
be an insufficient amount of time for conducting a proper evaluation to
ensure use of the nonconforming material does not compromise safety or
effectiveness. I learned the nonconforming materials were release for
build into DEMONSTRATION devices only; these components were not to be
built into devices intended to be used on patients.
I
had found conformance; all regulatory requirements had been met. I was
satisfied with the implementation of the company’s procedure; however, I
continued the audit by linking the use of nonconforming product to
material control. But why do this?
I
remembered during our initial tour of the manufacturing operations the
control of materials to production work-orders was through a KAN-BAN
system, where components are ‘pulled’ from inventory when needed. The
system did not ‘push’ product to specific work-orders as would be
required to ensure nonconforming product would only be used in
DEMONSTRATION devices only.
I
asked ‘what established procedures “push” nonconforming product
accepted for use “as-is” to the appropriate work-order for DEMONSTRATION
only units, so as to prevent inadvertent mix-up of this particular lot
of nonconforming components with other lots of the same component that
met specification?’
The
company thought about my question for a brief moment and their Director
responded that these special dispositions (use of nonconforming
products) require ‘micro-management’ by key people to prevent any
mix-up. No other procedures were established.
While
no specific evidence to support a noncompliance existed, I found the
company failed to recognize a “potential problem” which could create a
situation where nonconforming products are built into finished devices.
And as I think about it further, perhaps this company need to also
review their compliance with 21 CFR 820.86, Acceptance Status.”
820.86
Acceptance status. Each manufacturer shall identify by suitable means
the acceptance status of product, to indicate the conformance or
nonconformance of product with acceptance criteria.